Successive governments, along with political opponents of deportation, have frequently argued that the absence of formal agreements with certain countries hinders the UK’s ability to return immigrants to their countries of origin, even without obstacles posed by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) or the Human Rights Act (HRA). While this is a legitimate concern, it is not an insurmountable barrier.
The UK government has several mechanisms at its disposal to compel cooperation on the return of nationals, depending on the target country. Many primary source countries of immigration to the UK heavily depend on remittances—money transfers sent by their nationals in the UK back to their home countries—which often constitute a significant portion of their GDP. Therefore, halting remittances could serve as a powerful mechanism to enforce cooperation.
For instance, the UK could strategically block remittances to a country like Pakistan to pressure its government into accepting the return of immigrants. By imposing restrictions on money transfer operators (MTOs) such as Western Union and MoneyGram, the UK could mandate these companies to halt transactions to Pakistan, enforceable through threats of licence revocation or substantial penalties, effectively severing a critical financial lifeline.
This could be achieved by requiring MTOs to update their systems to reject Pakistan-bound transfers, with compliance overseen by regulators like the Financial Conduct Authority.
The UK remits approximately £1.7 billion annually to Pakistan, a figure that represents about 15% of Pakistan’s total remittances and a significant share of its foreign exchange reserves. With remittances accounting for roughly 8–10% of Pakistan’s GDP, this influx is vital for economic stability, household income support, and offsetting trade deficits.
Disrupting this substantial economic resource would place immense pressure on the target country, likely compelling cooperation on immigration returns to restore this essential financial connection.
